British Indidn Policy in the Northwest,
The partisan view that British agents were the sole cause of Indian discontent in the period before 1812 has rightly been subjected to considerable criticism in recent years. Historians have pointed out that had there been no British in Canada, the United States would still have been beset with the same Indian problem. I t was the advance of the American frontier, not a secret British conspiracy, that caused the Indian to take to the warpath. T h e pertinent question is not, "Did the British cause the Indian discontent?" but rather, "To what extent did they take advantage of a discontent that already existed?" Unfortunately, the necessity of combating partisan views has prevented a completely adequate answer to this far more relevant question.
Between the years 1794 and 1807 British interest in the Indians had undergone a steady decline,' and it was not until the turmoil in Anglo-American relations brought about by the Chesapeake affair in June, 1807, that the British in Canada once again actively sought the aid of their old allies. T h e news of the incident, and of the bellicose American reaction, reached Canada in July, and immediately produced a fear of invasion.' This fear prompted British action among the Indians in the years preceding the W a r of 1812. I n the summer and autumn of 1807 the officers of the Indian Department in Can& began the task of regaining the affection of the InSee Francis Gore to Sir J a m e s Craig, April 2, 1808, Alichigan Pioneer and Historbiol Collections (Lansing), X X V (1896), 240; also Thomas McKet. to Prideaux Selby, .%ugust 12, 1804, ibtd., XXIII (1895), 31-31.
2 T h e best treatment of this eflect is Ernest A. Cruikshan!~, "The Chesri~ra.heCrisis as I t Affected U p p e r Canada," Ontario Historicill Society Paprrs and Records ( T oronto), XXIV (1927) , 281-327. T h e r e is verq-little analysis, but considerable source material. See also Isaac Erock to 'Thomas Dunn. J u l y 15 a n d 23, !835, a n d Brock to Castlereagh, J u l y 2 i , 1837, Ferdinand B. T u p p e r , L i f e and Correspondrnct. of 2llajor General Sir Isaac BrocR (London, 18-47), [60] [61] [62] [63] . 51
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dians. Thoie who had gathered at Amherstburg in the fall for the usual distribution of supplies were warned before they left that the! might be summoned in the near future, and message5 were sent to the nations west of Lake Michigan asking them to visit the post.3 T h e formulation of a general policy in the face of the threat of war wa5 the taik of the new1:-appointed governor-in-chief, Sir James Craig, who reached Canada in late October, 1807.+ The instructions he issued between December. 1807, and May, 1808, laid the basis of British policy in the vital >ears before the spring of 181 1. They reflected his belief that in the e\ ent of war the Inclianb would not be idle, and that if England did not employ them there was not the slighteqt doubt that America w o u l d . C~r a i g himself had no desire to precipitate a conflict, but he had to insure that if war came the Indianc would flock to the British standard. His problem was to conciliate the Indians without sending them in premature attacks on the &American frontier, and without driving the Americans into a war to prevent the Anglo-Indian alliance. H i s solution to thi\ problem was in effect the suggestion of a dual policy -one public, one prij ate. H e apparently thought that the Indian5 could be kept from actual warfare if the agents could persuade them to join the British cause without any discussion of the possibility of war against the Americans. Thus he advised that in dealing with the Indians the agents should avoid coming to any " explanation," as he termed it, for as long as possible, though he was careful to q u a l i f~ this with the significant, "at l a s t to an) public explanation." fi Several weeks later, at the end of December, 1807, the hint that more could be said in private than in public received more definite expression. At this time Craig explained that there was every reason for the British to be succesful in wooing the Indians; the longlasting ties between them, the protection and supplies that Britain could give, and the Indian antipathy towartl the Americans, who obviously desired to take their lands, were all conducive to this end.
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These facts not only should be held up to the Indians in great councils, he said, but they should also be urged privately to some of their leading men. "Two or three gained over to us," he wrote, "will be of more avail than all that can be said in a Council." '
The reaction of Francis Gore, the lieutenant go\ernor of Upper Canada, to Craig's instructions helps us to develop this theme further. ,4t the beginning of January, Gore had expressed agreement with Craig's plans, adding that they should take care "not to be too passive." T o w a r d the end of the month, writing to \\'illiam Claus, the de;>uty superintendent of Indian affairs, he formulated more clearly the ideas of the governor-in-chief. Ciaus was to proceed personally to Amherstburg and assemble the chiefs of the Shawnees and other nations. H e was "to consult Privately" with them on the critical situation, and when a favorable opportunity appeared he was to remind them of the "artful and clandestine manner" in which the Americans had taken their lands, and of the fact that the Americans intended ultimately to drive them from the whole country. T h e dominating theme of these instructions was secrecy. Claus was to establish contact with the Shawnee chief, Captain Johnny, and, if he found him trustworthy, was to use him to communicate confidentially with the other chiefs. H e should, if possible, confide in only one interpreter. If he found it necessary to make a speech in public council, he was to limit his remarks to general comments on the wish of the Great Father to remain in friendship and harmony with the I n d i a n~.~ Thus, by January, 1808, a dual policy was inaugurated by which, in public, very little of importance should be \aid and the Americans conciliated, while in private the Indian< were to be reminded of the sins of the Americans. \f7ithin a few weeks the British had intensified this policj-, and, surprisingly enough, for reazons unconnected with the danger of American invasion. In hlay, 1808, because of rumors of Napoleon's desire to re-establish the French T H E lMISSISSIPP1 VALLEY HISTORICAL R E V I E W Empire in America, Craig became alarmed over the possibility of the arrival on the American continent of French forces, who would be more adept than the British at making friends with the Indians.'" As a result, he came to the conclusion that the Indians were more important than he had thought when he first arrived in North America, and even greater efforts would have to be made to attach them to the British cause. I n particular, he suggested that some means might be employed for opening an intercourse "with the nations situated to the Southward." Gore, in Upper Canada, was l1 quick to oblige, and in J u n e he replied that trusty and confidential persons would be employed to communicate with the Indians to the south and west." The old bogy-of French action in the New World had combined with the fear of American invasion to produce a policy of active secret communication with the tribes in American territory. T o be sure, the British policy was to secure allies for a probable future war, not to precipitate war itself, but the policy in action would hardly increase the probability of peace.
In discussing the Anglo-Indian relations of this period it is necessary to realize that carrying on negotiations with the Indians was a vastly different proposition from conducting relations with a sovereign, independent state. T h e dispatches between England and the governor-in-chief, and between the governor-in-chief and Upper Canada, canr,ot be treated as though they were a part of a Bismarckian diplomacy. Ultimately, British policy in the Northwest was channeled through two small posts --Amherstburg, near Detroit, and St. Joseph's near Michilimackinac. Amherstburg, the post near the main American line of settlement, was by far the more important of the two,'%nd it was from this spot on the Detroit River that the official British policy was disseminated to the Indians of the 
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Northwest. Here the Indians came to receive supplies, meet in public council, and talk in confidence to the representatives of their Great Father. T h e Indian agent, who verbally communicated the policy of his government, held the key to Anglo-Indian relations. H e had the responsibility of putting the dispatches from his superiors into language that the Indians could understand, and in doing this he obviously had a power to influence polic~. far beyond his actual position in government. Working without adequate supervision, his character and prejudices could make or mar a policy as subtle a. Craig's, whose instructions had given great powers of discretion to the man on the spot.
At the time of the Chesapeake crisis, Thomas NlcKee. son of the more famous iilexander, was superintendent of Indian affairs at Amherstburg. McKee, however, was apparently seldom sober,14 and, once it became clear that there was need for intricate negotiations, the officials of Upper Canada began to exert pressure for his removal. and for the appointment of matth hew Elliott.'" Elliott, who became superintendent at Amherstburg in May, 1808, and who was to hold the key position in Anglo-Indian affairs in the years before 1812, deserves more attention than has hitherto been given to him. An Irishman who had emigrated to America during the French and Indian War, Elliott had spent a lifetime among the Indians. As a trader in western Pennsylvania and Ohio in the 1760's and 1770's, and as a captain in the British Indian Department during the Revolution, he had lived and fought among the tribes of the Korthwest, particularly the Shawnees. After the Revolution he had traded and acted as a British agent in western Ohio. Married to a Shawnee woman, and speaking the language fluently, his sympathie. were with the Indians. In the years before Fallen Timbers he was active in organizing resistance to the Americans.'' H e had become superintendent at Amherstburg in 1796 but had been dismissed two years later, after a dispute over irregularities in the issuing of provisions. I n spite of repeated petitions, and even a trip to England, Elliott, u p to 1808, had not succeeded in obtaining a reversal of this decision.''
The crisis of 1807-1808 found Elliott living in considerable splendor, with numerous slaves, on his farm at ,4mherstburg.18 Elliott him\elf could not have relished the prospect of an American invasion. The Americans hated him. When he visited Detroit in October, 1807, in a futile attempt to recover some of his escaped slaves, who, along with others from Amherstburg, had been formed into a renegade company of militia by the Americans, he had to return home bq a devious route to avoid being tarred and feathered. And, in November, reports came from American sources that if war came Canada would be invaded and Elliott, among others, would surely be put to d e a t h . l V t is not really surprising that, even before his reappointment, he entered on voluntary service for Claus. When Claus arrived at Amherstburg in February, 1808, in accordance with Gore's orders, and found no one he could trust among more than six hundred Indians assembled there, he naturally turned to Elliott. A messenger recommended by Elliott was sent to the Auglaize to ask the Shawnee chiefs and the Prophet to come to the post." In hlarch these chiefs, though not the Prophet, arrived, and Claus, following Craig's instructions, held a private meeting with three of them. H e told them that the British were trying to preserve peace, and that if these efforts failed their friend Elliott would send for them. H e a150 told them how the Indians were being cheated out of their lands by the Ameri~ans.~' M7hen Gore reported this visit to Craig, he spoke of the great attachment of the Shawnees to E l l i~t t .~~ T h e reason for the frequent occurrence of Elliott's name in these egot ti at ions is not hard to understand. H e had a connection with the Shawnees stretching back over forty years, and he naturally maintained it in spite of his dismissal in 1798. Two Shawnee chiefs -the Bonner (who,
Although the Prophet dld not come into Amherstburg with the Shawnee chiefs in March, 1808, he did send a message of friendship through Fisher. who had just been reappointed as i n t e r~r e t e r .~' Elliott himself, after having served voluntarily through the earlier part of 1808, finally regained his po~ition in May. Craig, who had been under constant pressure from Tpper Canada to reappoint him, finally yielded when he decided there was a French as well as an American threat in the S e w \;1J0rld.'~ Shortly after Elliott took over ns Indian superintendent, in June, Tecum4eh came to the post in place of his brother, who had been \ummoned again in May. Clauh, who was still at Amheritburg co-operating with Elliott, had three hours of private con\er.ation with Tecumseh and four other 21 Cldus to Selby, March 25, 1808, zbtd., S V (1889), 45-46, and "Proceedings of a P r~v a t e Meeting w~t h the Shawenoes," tbtd., S S V (1896), 242-45. 49 ; also, Claus to Gore, hla) 22, 1808, zbld., S S I I I (1895), 62.
-"rag to Gore, hlay 11, 1808. tbtd., S X \ -(18961, 256. members of his band.'Traig's policy, transmitted by Gore, of innocuous speeches in public and weighty meetings with influential chiefs in private, was proceeding smoothly by the summer of 1808. As he had desired, confidential intercourse had been opened with the nations to the south, and efTorts were still being made to cornmunicate with the nations to the west. The tribes west of Lake Michigan, to which invitations had been sent in the previous October, had not yet arrived, so yet another messenger was sent to visit them." I t is not surprising that the American records of this period are filled with references to the British agents working among the Indians.
These activities of 1808, which culminated in the visit of some five thousand Indians to Amherstburg in the fall," were apparently very satisfactory to Elliott. I n February, 1809, he estimated that with only one regular regiment Detroit and all the country between it and the Ohio wlould soon be in British possession, and the Indians actively in support. Gore thought him too sanguine in his hopes of Indian assista~lce,~' but Gore had no way of knowing what had been said in private between Elliott and his old friends.
Far away in London, Viscount Castlereagh, the Secretary of State for W a r and the Colonies, had no time to spare for the organization of an Indian policy in Upper Canada. If possible, he wanted Canada defended, but he certainly wanted to give no overt offense to the United States." Far from the scene of affairs, he was obliged to depend upon the policy of the British officials in Canada. I n April, 1809, he wrote to Craig agreeing with his principle that, in the event of war, if the British did not use the Indians the Americans would. H e was ready therefore to support any temporary arrangements that Craig might make.34 Castlereagh depended on Craig, Craig on Gore, Gore on Claus, and Claus on Elliott, and there was no written proof by which to check the final policy.
Gobernor Craig's interest in the affairs of the Indian Depart-ment, which had waned after the excitement of 1808," was revived in the fall of 1810. From that time it became increasingly obvious that the Indians were preparing for war on the Americans, and the British felt sure that they would be blamed. Elliott, in October, 18 10, had already written of this danger, and in November, when Tecumseh visited Anlherstburg and made it plain in his speeches that the Indians were ripe for war. Elliott wrote again, asking for detailed and explicit instructions to regulate his future Since 1808 the British position had changed. In 1808 the British had been afraid that they had lost their influence over the Indians, and that the Indians were not sufficiently embittered against the Americans. In the fall of 1810 these doubts were at an end -the Indians were now anxious for war, and the new problem was how to keep them in check until the British needed them, and yet still retain their friendship.
Craig was now in a most embarrassing position, for if he allowed the Indian Department t o follow his own earlier instructions he ran the risk of provoking the Americans into a war that his own government did not want. The result was that, for the first time, Craig was forced to maintain a true neutrality in regard to the Indians and the Americans. Already, before receiving Elliott's request for instructions, he had written to John Philip Morier, the British chargC d'affaires in Washington, asking him to warn the Americans of their impending Indian war. In his ~nstructions of February, 1811, he stated that the officers of the Indian Department should use every effort to dissuade the Indians from war with the United States, and should make it clear that they could expect no assistance from Great Britain." This conduct was above reproach, but one cannot escape the conclusion that in the early months of 1811 Craig was desperately trying to avert hostilities toward which his own policy had contributed. Perhaps the best proof of this is to turn once again t o the visit of T e c u m~e h to Amheritburg in S o \ ember, 1810. 'The firit point of interebt is that though Elliott wrote for full instructions immediately after Tecumseh's wnrllke bpeech, he did not receil e them until some four months later." Thus Elliott, in treating with the Indians in the annual fall \ isit of K O \ ember, 181 0, was not guided by Craig's new restrictive policy, and by the next November Tecumseh was among the southern tr~bes, and Tippecanoe was being fought. Elliott, in writing for inbtructions, had stated that he realized that he should do nothing o\ertly, but wondered whether it would not be proper to keep up "the prebent spirit of resistance." * Available evidence points to the fact that, ha\ ing to make the decision himself, thi\ wai exactly what he did.
Colonel Isaac Brock, military commander in Upper Canada, wrote to Craig in February, 181 1, on the subject of the Kovember council. This letter was a condemnation of Elliott. Brock regretted that when the Indians had retired from the council at which they had declared their intention of going to war, they were fully convinced that although they could not look for active co-operation they could rely with confidence upon receiving from the British every requisite of war. How, he asked, could a cold attempt to dissuade the Indians from war be expected to succeed, when the distribution of a liberal quantity of military stores plainly indicated a contrary sentiment'? If the Indians determined t o commit any acts of hostility in the spring, they would be too far away for the acts to be averted by the ~r i t i s h . Elliott, he said, was a good man and well respected by the Indians, but having lived a good deal among them in his youth, "he has naturally imbibed their feelings and prejudices, and partaking in the wrongs they continually suffer, this sympathy made him neglect the considerations of prudence, which ought t o have regulated his conduct. mandant at the poit, had been particularly sarcastic over the Department's contact with the Indians. H e had stated that the whole of the Indian Department at Amherstburg was connected to the Shawnee. "t.lther by hIarriage or Concubinage," and that this was the cau.e of that nation being more troublesome than any other.4' H e had alio attacked the \ell of >ecrecy with which the Department c1o:tked it, affair\, and the fact that the interpreters were all coml)letel! under the influence of Elliott."
Craig joined Brock in rekiving thii distrukt of Elliott in 181 1. In fact Brock's letter on the subject w,is prompted by a confidential letter from Cr'iig. Only two day5 'liter iisuing definite instructions that the Indians should be restrained, Craig wrote to Brock asking him to h a l e the military oficeri a t the different posts, particularly A4n~herstburg, report confidentiall~ on what happened a t the councils between the Indian agents and the Indians.** Once Craig had dec~d e don a polic) of absolute restraint in regard to the Indians, he considered it necessary t o spy upon Elliott, though he had given him a free hand for three years. One month later, in March, 181 1, Brock communicated Craig's order to hlajor Taylor a t Amherstburg. H e repeated large 5ections of the Governor's letter, and took the opportunity on his own account to warn Taylor about Elliott. "I should be unwilling," Brock wrote, "to place entire dependence, in an affa~r of kuch 1nanife.t importance, upon a judgement biassed and prrjudiced, as his is known to be, in rvery thing that regards the Indians. To act with due prudence, he participates in and feels too keenly the grievous wrongs they ha\.-e suffered." "' I t may justly be obsened that dependence had been placed on Elliott in this matter for some three vital jears, and whereas supervision might ha\e been uieful in 1808, it was a little late in 181 1. \That was said in confidence between Elliott and Tecumseh in Xo\ember, 1810, or earlier, will never be known. It is known, however, that in the following summer Tecumseh visited the southern British Indian policy in the second half of 181 1 and the first half of 1812 is perhaps best considered as an immediate prologue to the war itself, for the Indians during most of this time were in practically open warfare. In the fall of 181 1 the British officials in Canada were engaged in energetically preparing for a war, which they now thought inevitable." They again became convinced that they could not risk the alienation of the Indians, and by the close of 181 1 Craig's newly adopted policy of perfect neutrality began to crumble.
At the beginning of December, 18 1 1, Brock, who had become civil as well as military commander in Upper Canada in October, wrote an urgent letter to the new governor-in-chief, Sir George Prevost. Brock argued that Madison's warlike message to Congress justified the taking of every precaution, and he submitted his views on the state of Upper Canada. I t was to the Amherstburg district that Brock attached primary importance, and he believed that the military force there would have to be increased. In the event of war he thought that it would be necessary for the British to reduce Detroit a n d~i c h i l i m a c k i n a c in order to-convince the Indians that the war was being waged in earnest."
Prevost's reply to Brock is significant in showing to what extent he immediately returned to the Indian policy adopted by Craig in a similar crisis a t the end of 1807. H i s instructions copied, a t times word for word, the instructions issued by Craig on his arrival in Canada. Prevost wished the Indians to be attached to the British cause, but urged that if possible all "direct explanation" should be delayed until hostilities were more certain. Yet, whenever the subject of hostilities was mentioned, it was to be intimated that, as a matter of course, the British would expect the aid of their old allies. "I am sensible this require-delicacy," wrote Prevost, "still it should be done so as not to be misunderstood."
The governor-
I3
in-chief had little to fear, for at the beginning of 1812 Elliott was able to report from '4mherstburg that the majority of Indians from the St. Croix to the \;Crabash were on the side of the British.'' T h e urgent letter written by Brock had clearly expressed his belief that, in the event of war, Detroit and hlichilirnackinac would have to be taken by the British." In Januarj , 1813, British oificials entered into discussioiis with the great fur companies -the North \;Yest and the South \;Crest -which had great influence in the area wesi of Lake Michigan, in an attempt to enlist their aid in at least the capture of hlichilimackinac. The companies were not slow in offering their support. They reported to Prevost that they would "enter with zeal into any measure of Defence, or euen offence, that may be proposed to them." The companies were confident of their influence over the Indians, and in the event of war promised the assistance both of their own men and of their Indian allies.'"
The British clearly realized that in the vast area west of Lake Michigan it was necessary to depend upon the co-operation of the fur trading interests. Robert Dickson, foremost British trader on the upper Nlississippi, volunteered his services before leaving for his winter quarters in that area,j3 and during the winter he apparently did all he could t o counter American efforts to gain control of the Indians. H e was aided in this by the long, harsh winter of 1811-1812, which made the Indians dependent upon him for supplies. Inspired by both humanitarian and political motives, Dickson capitalized on the opportunity by distributing a large quantity of stores.54
T H E M I S S I S S I P P I V A L L E Y HIS'TOKIC.4L R E V I E W
The British officials were well aware of Dickson's value, and in February, 1812, a list of confidential questions was sent to him, asking for the number of Indians he could muster in the event of war, and the supplies they would need." This letter, telling much of the primitive nature of frontier communications, did not actually reach Dickson untll the early part of June, when he was at the Fox-\4'isconsin portage, returning east from his winter quarters.:'" H e replied on June 18, the day Madison was signing the declaration of war, that he had some two hundred and fifty or three hundred Indians read! to march when necessary. They would be ready at St. Joseph's by about the thirtieth of the month..' Dickson's aid insured the British of support from the western Indians at the strategic position a t the outbreak of war.
In the winter of 181 1-1812, while Dickson was working in the west, British officials in Upper Canada were still endeavoring to secure the full co-operation of the Indians south of the Great Lakes. Matters were complicated by the fact that a slight rift had begun to appear between the golernor-in-chief, Prevost, and the official actually responsible for the defense of Vpper Canada, Iqaac Brock. Though Prelost had inaugurated his term a< governor-in-chief in December, 18 11, by reviving Craig's instructions of four years before, he did not elaborate these instructions in 1812 as Craig had in 1808. In the case of Prevost, the receipt of instructions from England in January, 1812, strongly urging him to avoid offending the United States, made him far Inore cautious in 1812 than Craig had been four years before." Brock, however, who was anxious for the safety of Upper Canada, chafed under the re\trictions imposed upon the Indian Department. H e warned P r e~o i t that each time the Indian officers advised peace and withheld a m~~~u n i t i o n British in-fluence would diminish, until it was lost altogether.'Vre\ost, on the other hand, asked him to exerciie forbearance, as England did not wiih to commit any overt act which would give the Americans justification for war."
Throughout the spring of 1812 the same pattern continued.
Prevost, anxious not to provoke war, urged caution, while Brock and the members of the Indian Department tried, as secretly as possible, to prepare the Indians for war." They were apparently confident of success, for in &lay a Canadian visitor to Francis Gore in London learned that Gore had received letters from the Indian Department in Upper Canada, and the visitor came away with the impression that "the Indians are all on our side." " At the beginning of the war friendly Indians were converging on the British posts both in the west at St. Joseph's, and in the east at Amherstburg. In early June, news was brought down from Detroit to Fort Wayne that the Indians were crossing over to Amherstburg in large numbers, and it was believed that some 1,800 were already gathered at the post.'3 Claus himself arrived at Amherstburg on June 14, and was able to transmit to Brock a message from Tecumseh, with whom Brock had communicated during the winter. Tecumseh expressed disgust at the rash action of the Indians while he was away -they had acted before his plans were fully matured -but now he himself seemed ready for war, and impatient for the British to engage in open warfare with the United States.6i On June 20 the Indian agent at Fort Wayne reported that Tecumseh had visited the post three days earlier on his way to Amherstburg to get powder and lead. 65 The vital years in Anglo-Indian relations in this period were those from mid-1807 to the outbreak of open warfare between the Indians and the Americans in the fall of 1812. The fundamental cause of this conflict was the Indian realization that the advance of the American frontier was depriving them of their way of life. Yet it is apparent that the policy of the British officials in Canada had contributed to the Indian discontent, and had helped the organization of Indian resistance to the Americans. Governor Craig apparently thought that his agents could with one hand sketch the American design to appropriate the Indian lands, and with the other hold back the Indians in readiness for the defense of Canada. T o undertake this complex task he consented, under pressure, to the appointment of an agent who, in the words of Brock, was "biassed and prejudiced . . .in every thing that regards the Indians." When we consider this in relation to the rapid encroachment of the Americans on the Indian lands, it is perhaps not surprising that by the fall of 1810 the Indians were ripe for war.
Craig did not desire to precipitate a war with the Americans, but in order to win the support of the Indians for the defense of Canada he gave his agents the power to communicate in secrecy with the Indians within American territory. Prevost, in the months preceding the war, faced the same difficulties as Craig. T o insure Indian support he was obliged to delegate authority, and in delegating authority he reduced his own ability to maintain a true neutrality along the American border. Arguments used by the British to convince the Indians that they should fight at a future date for the defense of Canada could also be used by the Indians as reasons for offensive warfare against the Americans. The Indians accepted support and encouragement from Canada, but their needs were offensive as well as defensive, and the British in the period 1807 to 1812, as in earlier years, discovered that the Indians had a remarkable will of their own. 
